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VASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
University of Washington, but that the University itself is not exempt
from the APA 6
In summary, the Nostrand case (1) creates confusion on the injury
a plaintiff must suffer before having standing to challenge a state stat-
ute, (2) sanctions the discharge of state employees for refusal to swear
a loyalty oath without an opportunity for a statutory hearing to explain
the refusal, and (3) seems to exempt the University of Washington
from the state Administrative Procedure Act. Nostrand, however, does
put Washington in accord with a majority of states which allow
creation of employment qualifications in the form of loyalty oaths."
DAVID C. LYCETTE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
Disciplinary Proceedings-Mental Competency. May mental irre-
sponsibility be an effective defense in disciplinary proceedings brought
against an attorney? The Washington court answered in the affirmative
in the recent case of In re Sherman,' setting forth the requirements for
such a defense.
In 1960 the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar Asso-
ciation recommended "the disbarment of Arthur Eber Sherman, Jr.,
for making false answers in his application for admission [by examina-
tion] to practice law in the state of Washington."' The board also rec-
ommended a reprimand for insulting and contemptuous petitions for
46 Subsequent to Nostrand, the Washington Supreme Court determined that the state
APA repealed, by implication, a long standing statute which required appeals involving
the Public Service Commission to be filed within twenty days of judgment rather than
thirty. See Herrett Trucking Co. v. Washington Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 58 Wn.2d 542, 364
P.2d 505 (1961). Query, if the court could find legislative intent to repeal such a long
standing statute, why could it not find a similar intent to repeal statutes relating to the
operation of the University of Washington?
47 After this note was written, the plaintiffs' appeal to the Supreme Court was denied
in a per curiam decision on the ground that there was no substantial federal question.
368 U.S. 436 (1962).
1158 Wash. Dec. 399, 363 P.2d 390 (1961) (on rehearing). The first decision is
reported in 156 Wash. Dec. 531, 354 P.2d 888 (1960).
2RCW 2.48.060. "Admission and disbarment. The said board of governors shall
likewise have power... to investigate, prosecute and hear all causes involving discipline,
disbarment, suspension or reinstatement, and make recommendations thereon to the
supreme court...."
3 It re Sherman, 156 Wash. Dec. 531, 354 P.2d 888 (1960). In December, 1956,
Sherman applied for permission to take the Washington bar examination. After falsely
stating that he had never before taken another bar examination, he ignored the ques-
tion, "If so, were you successful?" In fact, Sherman had twice taken, and failed, the




rehearing which Sherman had filed with the Oregon Supreme court
while a party to litigation there.
In the first Sherman decision, the court was satisfied that a case had
been made against Sherman, but it expressed concern as to whether he
was mentally responsible for what he had done.4 Because of this con-
cern, the court remanded to the Board of Governors of the Washington
State Bar Association for further investigation into Sherman's mental
condition, both at the time of the alleged misconduct and at present.
The court made it clear that the burden of proof was upon Sherman.
On rehearing of In re Sherman,' the court, adopting the suggestion of
amici curiae," indicated its present acceptance of these rules:
A. Mental irresponsibility is a complete defense to conduct of an attor-
ney which would otherwise warrant disciplinary action: (1) if such
conduct was the result or the consequence of mental incompetency;
and (2) if the mental condition which was responsible for such con-
duct has been cured so completely that there is little or no likelihood
of a recurrence of the condition. The burden of proof of this de-
fense, in all of its aspects, is upon the respondent attorney.7
B. If the respondent attorney is able to carry the burden of proof as to
his mental irresponsibility at the time of the conduct of which corn-
4 Sherman's record of mental problems began in 1946, when he was discharged from
the United States Army Air Corps with honors and decorations, but also with a diagno-
sis of "combat fatigue." He was admitted to the University of Michigan hospital in
1946 and his case summary included the following: "During his hospitalization the
patient demonstrated very asocial behavior. He was very antagonistic and lacking in
desire to be friendly or cooperative.
"... If the patient will accept psychotherapy it is felt that psychiatric aid would be
very desirable."
He again entered the university hospital in February, 1953. His case summary in-
cluded the following: "He demonstrated marked hostility of a diffuse nature which
did not suggest any paranoid tendency. The patient had no insight into his difficulty
and also had difficulty distinguishing fact from fantasy, although he appeared to be in
good contact and was oriented... [H]owever, his judgment was quite good.... The
consultant felt that he was a schizophrenic of the simple type, but felt that nothing
could be done about this immediately....
"... Recommendations: The patient should be observed for further change in hispsychiatric condition and if he does become paranoid, it would seem highly advisable to
carry out commitment at that time." In re Sherman, 156 Wash. Dec. 531, 532-33, 354
P.2d 888-89 (1960).
5 158 Wash. Dec. 399, 363 P.2d 390 (1961).
"The Honorable John J. O'Connell, Attorney General of the State of Washington,
and George Neff Stevens, Dean of the University of Washington School of Law. Dean
Stevens' recommendations are discussed in his article, 77e Lawyer's Mental Health and
Discipline, 48 A.B.A.J. 140 (1962).
7 11 re Sherman, 158 Wash. Dec. 399, 402, 363 P.2d 390, 392 (1961). The court cited
these cases in support of the rule: Threrd v. United States. 354 U.S. 278 (1957) ; Cane
v. State Bar of California, 14 Cal. 2d 597, 95 P.2d 934 (1939) ; In re Breding, 188 Minn.
367, 247 N.W. 694 (1933) ; In re Manahan, 186 Minn. 98, 242 N.W. 548 (1932) ; it re
Freedman, 7 App. Div. 2d 447, 184 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1959) ; In re Gould. 4 App. Div. 2d
174, 164 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1957) ; In re Creamer, 201 Ore. 343, 270 P.2d 159 (1954) ; In re
Durham, 41 Wn.2d 609, 251 P.2d 169 (1952).
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plaint is made, but is unable to prove recovery to the extent indi-
cated in 'A' and the court has reason to believe that such recovery is
possible, he will be suspended until such time as he can prove such
recovery-otherwise, he shall be disbarred.8
In the first Sherman case, the court indicated a willingness to follow
such a procedure when, as a prelude to deciding what action to take, it
remanded for an investigation of Sherman's mental condition. How-
ever, the court did not indicate specifically the consequence of a finding
of mental irresponsibility, either when the misconduct occurred or at
present. Nor did it state what disposition should be made of the case if
Sherman established his past incompetency, but successfully carried the
burden of proving his present competence and capability to practice
law. The second Sherman case answers these questions and becomes
the first Washington case to clearly recognize mental irresponsibility as
a possible defense to conduct which would otherwise warrant discipli-
nary action.
The only prior Washington case dealing with the problem is In re
Durham.' The disciplinary proceeding was commenced following Nel-
son Durham's trial in July, 1951, for accepting the earnings of a prosti-
tute. In the criminal action the jury found that he had committed the
acts charged, but held him not guilty by reason of insanity. He was
committed on January 25, 1952. Two weeks later he was released on a
court order finding that he was sane, safe to be at large, and that there
was little or no likelihood of a recurrence of his condition.
In subsequent disciplinary proceedings, the supreme court rejected
the Board of Governors' recommendation that Durham be suspended
for two years and until he submitted satisfactory evidence of his com-
petence to practice law. The court disbarred him because it felt his
continued membership in the bar would be detrimental to the public,
since it could not "certify to the public that he is now worthy of trust
and confidence or that he will be in the future .... I'l Because of
Durham's present incompetency to practice law, the court was not
forced to determine the consequences of mental incompetency when the
misconduct occurred.
S In re Sherman, 158 Wash. Dec. 399, 402, 363 P.2d at 392-93. The court cited these
cases in support of the rule: In re Chmelik, 203 Minn. 156, 280 NAV. 283 (1938) ;
In re Breding, supra note 7; In re Freedman, supra note 7; In re Dubinsky, 256 App.
Div. 102, 7 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1938) ; In re Creamer, supra note 7; In re Durham, supra
note 7.
9 41 Wn.2d 609, 251 P.2d 169 (1952).
30 Id. at 613, 251 P.2d at 171. Durham's petition for reinstatement was denied in
In re Durham, 159 Wash. Dec. 197, 367 P.2d 126 (1961).
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As the second Sherman case indicates,1 the position adopted finds
support in other jurisdictions. The standard presented by the Wash-
ington court has the advantage of being more precise than the other
verbal standards pronounced from the bench. However, some jurisdic-
tions, particularly Illinois 2 and Louisiana,13 have adopted a contrary
position, holding that mental irresponsibility is not a defense in disci-
plinary proceedings, even if the attorney can prove a complete recovery.
The position taken by the Washington court appears to be more in
accord with the purposes of a disciplinary proceeding. The court has
consistently held that the purpose of such proceedings is not punish-
ment, but rather the protection of the public and the maintenance of
high professional and ethical standards on the part of attorneys.'4 Dis-
barment of an attorney whose misconduct was the result or consequence
of mental irresponsibility, and who has since been completely cured,
cannot be soundly rationalized on the ground of public benefit.
The probability of any future harm to the public is so slight that,
when weighed against the harm to the attorney, disbarment would only
be for punishment. When the attorney is unable to prove present re-
covery, but the likelihood of such recovery is strongly indicated, sus-
pension pending proof of such future recovery also accomplishes the
purposes of disciplinary proceedings. Suspension safeguards the public
pending recovery and spares the attorney the stigma of disbarment, a
needless punishment under the circumstances.
It is worthwhile to note the disparity relative to the defense of in-
sanity which now exists in Washington. In criminal cases, the court
adheres to the old "MLcNaghten"'15 test of right and wrong. 6 In fact,
the court goes even further and requires not only that the accused not
be able to distinguish right from wrong, but also that he not have the
mental capacity to know the nature and quality of his act.' The Mc-
11 See cases cited supra notes 7 and 8.1 2 1 i re Patlak, 368 I1. 547, 15 N.E.2d 309 (1938).
13 Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Theard, 255 La. 98, 72 So. 2d 310 (1954), cert. de-
uied, 348 U.S. 832 (1954).
14 E.g., In re Purvis, 51 Wn2d 206, 316 P.2d 1081 (1957).
V; McNaghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). "To
establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
10 E.g., State v. Cogswell, 54 Wn.2d 240, 339 P.2d 465 (1959) ; State v. Craig, 52
INrash. 66, 100 Pac. 167 (1909).
17 State v. Collins, 50 Wn.2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957). By contrast, in People v.
Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 427, 3 N.E2d 581 (1936), it was held to be reversible error to use




Naghten Case expresses these requirements in the disjunctive, not the
conjunctive. 8 Washington has also rejected both the defense of "irre-
sistible impulse", 9 a supplement to the McNaghten rule,20 and the
Durham" rule, a replacement of the McNaghten rule.22 This, added to
the Washington requirement that the criminal defendant must prove his
insanity by a preponderence of the evidence," makes the defense ex-
tremely difficult to establish.
In disciplinary proceedings, the Sherman cases give Washington a
far more liberal approach when dealing with insanity. In fact, it is
worthwhile to compare the Sherman rules with both the Durham rule
and the rule proposed by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal
Code. Rule A says: "If such conduct was the result or the consequence
of mental incompetency ... " (Emphasis added.) 24 The Durham rule,
in its essence, is: "An accused is not criminally responsible if his un-
lawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." (Em-
phasis added.)2" The rule proposed by the American Law Institute is:
"A person is not responsible if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law." (Emphasis added.)26 Because of the flexibility
and special considerations present in disciplinary proceedings, it is
arguable that the liberal approach of the two rules will not be extended
into the more restricted and precedent-bound criminal area. As stated
in the second Sherman case, "decisions in disciplinary matters are not
precedents for any other class of cases."2 .
Another significant aspect of the second Sherman case results from
this statement: "We do, however, think it timely to state specifically
Is See note 15 supra.
19 Smith v. United States, 36 F2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929).20 State v. Maish, 29 Wn.2d 52, 185 P.2d 486 (1947).21 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
22 State v. Collins, 50 Wn.2d 740, 314 P2d 660 (1957).
2 3 State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 Pac. 98 (1904). This case indicates that the
following jurisdictions give the prosecutor the burden of disproving insanity, once the
defendant has raised the issue: The Supreme Court of the United States, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
York, Tennessee, Vermont and Wisconsin. In Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409,
198 N.E. 641 (1935), Massachusetts adopted a similar position.
24 I, re Sherman, 158 Wash. Dec. 399, 402, 363 P2d 390, 392 (1961).25 Durham v. United States, 214 F2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).2 6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed final draft No. 11961). A rule very similar
to that in the MODEL PENAL CODE was adopted by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961). The court rejected the
phrase "to appreciate the criminality of his conduct!' and substituted the phrase "to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have vio-
lated." Id. at 774. See also 23 U. PiTT. L. REv. 239 (1961).2 7 1n re Sherman, 158 Wash. Dec. 399, 401, 363 P.2d 390, 391 (1961).
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what we have heretofore implied but not clearly articulated, i.e., that a
disciplinary proceeding is a special proceeding, neither civil nor crimi-
nal, incident to the inherent power of the court to control its officers and
is sui generis."2 The court's definition of the nature of a disciplinary
proceeding is welcome due to the confusion its past definitions have
created. In State v. Willis,2" the court said: "It is true, we have held
that a disbarment proceeding 'is in the nature of a civil action' ... but
we are of the opinion it is not a civil action in the strict sense .... ." In
re Jet 3 stated: "The answer to this is that the proceeding is a civil,
and not criminal, one." In re Little3 recognized the difficulty of draw-
ing an analogy from other legal proceedings and modified the Jett case
by stating that a disciplinary proceeding is "quasi-criminal, in that it is
for the protection of the public and is brought for the misconduct of the
lawyer involved." 2
Because, as the court stated in Sherman, it has inherent power to con-
trol its officers,3 and because of the nature of the proceeding, the court
indicated that it has a duty to insist upon a complete investigation of
every facet of the case which is "relevant and material."'" Therefore,
when the mental competency of an attorney is "relevant and material"
to the ultimate decision, the court, as in the Sherman cases, will remand
for a further investigation, even though the attorney has not previously
raised the defense of mental incompetency.
The Sherman cases clearly indicate the Washington court's aware-
ness of the dual purpose of a disciplinary proceeding. The promulgation
of the two rules relative to the defense of mental incompetency, and the
court's willingness to remand for additional investigation, illustrate the
lengths to which the court is willing to go in order to fully and com-
pletely safeguard the attorney's interest, while simultaneously balanc-
ing and safeguarding the public interest. Whether the liberality of the
new rules is indicative of the court's attitude toward the whole area of
insanity and criminal responsibility remains to be seen.
EVAN L. ScmvAB
28 Id. at 400, 363 P2d at 391.
20 95 Wash. 251, 252, 163 Pac. 737 (1917).
30 6 Wn.2d 724, 729, 108 P.2d 635, 637 (1940).
3140 Wn.2d 421, 244 P.2d 255 (1952).
32 Id. at 430, 244 P.2d at 259.
933  re Sherman, 158 Wash. Dec. 399, 400, 363 P.2d 390, 391 (1961). The Wash-
ington court originally recognized its inherent power in In re Lambuth, 18 Wash. 478,
51 Pac. 1071 (1898). Other cases to the same effect are: In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472,
172 Pac. 1152 (1918); It re Robinson, 48 Wash. 153, 92 Pac. 929 (1907). RCW
2.48.060 recognized the court's inherent power.
34 I; re Sherman, 158 Wash. Dec. 399, 401, 363 P.2d 390, 391.
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